More thanks coming soon…

Meanwhile, the Libyan PM can help assess this:

From: randy.forbes@mail.house.gov
Date: Mon, 31 Oct 2011 08:44:33 -0400
Subject: Does Defense Manufacturing Matter?

 

Dear Friend –

In 1997, the United Kingdom initiated a program to develop a nuclear attack submarine. But some five to six years into the program, it became clear that neither the prime contractor nor any other British firm had the necessary design and production skills to build the new submarine. Without a domestic ability to produce submarines, the United Kingdom was forced to look abroad in order to complete their project.

Fortunately, the British were able to look to United States and employ one of our shipyards to provide the missing skills and expertise. With American help, the Astute class was completed in February 2010. However, by then the cost for the first three Astute-class submarines had reportedly grown by 90%, and the first of the class was some four years late.

If the U.S. military one day found itself in the same position as the British did with the Astute program, it would have few places to turn for help since no allies currently maintain the breadth and depth of capabilities resident in the U.S. defense industry.

Defense manufacturing is worth protecting. Let’s take a look at this snapshot of defense manufacturing in America:
The Workforce-
Take for example one American shipbuilding company that currently employs 39,000 people:

  • More than 7,500 engineers.
  • More than 1,000 employees with advanced degrees.
  • More than 19 different crafts and trades.
  • Over 700 master shipbuilders (over 40 years experience).

The defense industry employs some of America’s best and brightest:

  • Skilled technicians and designers that have produced our fleet of nuclear powered submarines and aircraft carriers- a fleet with over 145 million miles safely steamed on nuclear power.
  • Skilled engineers that have designed the most advanced and capable aircraft in the world.

As production jobs and capability decline, the ability to recover these critical skills becomes very expensive or even impossible as highly skilled personnel are forced to pursue other careers.

The Production Lines-
Historically the United States has been able to convert commercial manufacturing to produce defense products during a time of crisis:

  • During, WWII manufacturers of consumer products like toys and arcade games were able to rapidly shift production to military munitions in support of the war effort.
  • Today, U.S. has lower manufacturing capacity and weapons are more specialized than they were 50-plus years ago.
  • We need a strategy to maintain the skills and infrastructure of these production lines.

Shuttering existing lines will diminish or eliminate our capabilities should we need them in a time of crisis.

The Suppliers-
The industrial base is much broader than the top tier, Fortune 500 defense contractors.  The small business suppliers are a vital component that is often overlooked.  Look at just two examples:

  • Since 2004, 1,600 vendors in 42 states have filled orders totaling over $3 billion to build our nation’s aircraft carriers.
  • The Joint Strike Fighter supply chain spans 1,300 companies in 47 states and supports nearly 127,000 direct and indirect U.S. jobs.

According to Pentagon analysis, the defense industrial base provides 3.8 million private sector jobs.  Trillion dollar cuts to nation defense will result in:

Job Losses.
Hundreds of thousands of jobs lost within the defense industry.  Much of the engineering and technical experience lost will be impossible to recover or rebuild in the future.

Shipyard Closures.
Shuttering of U.S. shipyards, which are the largest manufacturers in Mississippi, Louisiana, Virginia, and Maine.

Atrophy of innovation.
Looming defense cuts will invariably eliminate entire sectors of the industrial base and lead to less competition.  With far fewer manufactures, remaining companies will lack incentive to come up with new, better, or cheaper solutions for our warfighters.

Inability to rapidly reconstitute critical skills in response to emergent threats.
The ability of the United States soldier, sailor, airman, or Marine to maintain a technological advantage on the battlefield would be in jeopardy.

Few have contemplated a future where the United States, when confronted with a crisis on the scale of Pearl Harbor or 9/11, must predicate its response with “Can we?” rather than “Will we?” Such a way of life is worth protecting.

Yours in Service,

Randy Forbes

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